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ESSAY
MAKING SENSE OF THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL
David Skeel†
I. INTRODUCTION
A few years ago, a poet friend of mine wrote a poem called “The Game
Changed,” which concludes with a line about a “continuity in which
everything is transition.”1 He was talking about 9/11 in particular, but the
same thing is true anytime there is a fundamental social shift. We are in the
middle of a fundamental shift. For all of us, and especially for those of you
who have just graduated from law school, the game has changed.
You see this all around you. If you were applying for jobs last fall, you
entered a law firm recruiting world that has been transformed. I was talking
with a partner in a big city law firm the week before I gave the talk on
which this Essay is based. She said she loves the new world. In the old
days, she said, it was hard to get a young associate’s attention; there was a
general air of entitlement. But now they want to know how they can help, if
there is anything they can do for you. This is not a bad attitude to have, but
it reflects a deep uncertainty about the job situation.
We have just had a transformative election, just two years after another
transformative election.2 What does this mean? It may simply mean that
transformative elections are not what they used to be. It probably also
means that there will not be any more massive legislation anytime soon,
and thus that we now have to play with the cards we have been dealt over
the last two years. So this is a good time to ask where we are right now in
the financial world.

†

S. Samuel Arsht Professor of Corporate Law, University of Pennsylvania. This
Essay began its life as a talk delivered at Liberty University School of Law on November 18,
2010. My thanks to Dan Yamauchi and the Liberty University Law Review; Jason Heinen
and Liberty University School of Law Chapter of the Federalist Society; and to the audience
for their hospitality. I am grateful to them and to participants at the “Corporate Governance
and Business Ethics in a Post-Crisis World” conference at Notre Dame Law School for
helpful comments.
1. LAWRENCE JOSEPH, The Game Changed, in INTO IT: POEMS 63, 65 (2005).
2. I refer, of course, to the sweeping Republican victories in Congress and in state
governors’ elections in 2010, which came just two years after the election of Barack Obama,
America’s first black president, and a Democratic sweep in 2008.
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To answer this question, I will begin by briefly reviewing the causes of
the crisis. By now, this is a very familiar story, so I will keep this part of the
discussion especially brief.
This will set the stage for our principal topic, the new financial reforms
known as the Dodd-Frank Act.3 Like it or not, the new law will shape the
regulatory landscape for the next generation, so it is important to start
thinking about it sooner rather than later. One of my main themes here will
be that our financial world is just as prone to bailouts after Dodd-Frank as it
was before, and that it would have made a lot more sense to focus on
bankruptcy as the solution of choice for troubled financial institutions.
I will then discuss the CEOs and bonuses that have gotten so much
attention in the press.4 I will use this as a segue into a discussion about how
Christians might think about issues like financial regulation that seem so far
removed from the Gospel.
II. CAUSES OF THE CRISIS
The context for our discussion of the new regulatory regime is the
financial crisis that began in 2007 and climaxed with the collapses of
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, AIG, and
others in the fall of 2008.5
When people first asked me what I thought the real causes of the 20072008 financial crisis were, I used to say: “I’m just a country law professor,
not an economist, so I really am not qualified to opine on this.” But I long
ago stopped letting the limits of my expertise interfere with the opportunity
to express an opinion—I am, after all, a law professor—and I now tend to
give the following answer: “It’s really quite simple,” I say:


We now know that the Panic was caused by the Bush
administration’s Ownership Society—the administration

3. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1376-2223 (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C. titles: 2, 5, 7,
11, 12, 16, 18, 19, 20, 22, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 41, 42, 44, 49, 112) [herinafter the “DoddFrank Act”].
4. See, e.g., Edward Hadas, Martin Hutchinson & Antony Currie, American Wages out
of Balance, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2009, at B2.
5. These developments have been the focus of many good, popular-level books.
Among the best are WILLIAM D. COHAN, HOUSE OF CARDS: A TALE OF HUBRIS AND
WRETCHED EXCESS ON WALL STREET (2009); ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE
INSIDE STORY OF HOW WALL STREET AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL
SYSTEM FROM CRISIS—AND THEMSELVES (2009); DAVID WESSEL, IN FED WE TRUST: BEN
BERNANKE’S WAR ON THE GREAT PANIC (2009).
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was so obsessed with expanding home ownership that no
one paid any attention to whether the home buyers could
actually afford the loans they took out to buy the homes.6
Except that it was caused by Congressman Barney Frank’s
stubborn resistance to reforming Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac, the two giant, government-sponsored (and since
September 2008, government-owned) entities that buy or
guaranty a large percentage of the nation’s home
mortgages.7
But the real reason for the mess was the Federal Reserve’s
monetary policy—the Federal Reserve kept interest rates so
low, for so long, that they fueled the speculative bubble in
the real estate markets.8
Except that this would not have been such a problem if it
were not for securitization—the exotic process by which
mortgages were transferred to newly created entities,
repackaged, and interests in the new entities sold to
institutions and investors. Lenders who once might have
held onto the mortgages they received from their borrowers
immediately sold them and made more loans, without

6. Raghuram Rajan offers an intriguing version of this thesis. Rajan argues that
politicians (in the Clinton Administration as well as its successors in the Bush
Administration) consciously or unconsciously pushed for “easy money” to deflect concerns
about rising income inequality. “[I]f somehow the consumption of middle-class
householders keeps up,” he writes, “perhaps they will pay less attention to their stagnant
monthly paychecks.” RAGHURAM G. RAJAN, FAULT LINES: HOW HIDDEN FRACTURES STILL
THREATEN THE WORLD ECONOMY 8-9 (2010).
7. Peter Wallison of the American Enterprise Institute was an early critic of Fannie
Mae and Freddy Mac, arguing that they were highly politicized and could become an
enormous problem if they threatened to fail. For a more recent retrospective, see PETER J.
WALLISON & CHARLES W. CALOMIRIS, THE LAST TRILLION-DOLLAR COMMITMENT: THE
DESTRUCTION OF FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC (2009). Wallison also sounded this theme
in his dissent to the report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, as described in note
15 infra.
8. Early on, the Federal Reserve’s policy of keeping interest rates low after the dot
com bubble collapsed in 2000 was widely viewed as brilliant—as part of Alan Greenspan’s
magical touch. See, e.g, BOB WOODWARD, MAESTRO: GREENSPAN’S FED AND THE AMERICAN
BOOM (2000). Most commentators now question the policy, and its continuation by
Greenspan’s successor, Ben Bernanke.
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paying any attention to the credit-worthiness of their
borrowers.9
And yet the credit rating agencies could have blown the
whistle before it was too late by refusing to give the new
mortgage-backed securities the high ratings that enabled
insurance companies, pensions and other institutions to buy
them; but the credit rating agencies faced such serious
conflicts of interest, and so poorly understood the securities
they were rating, that they handed investment grade ratings
to nearly every new securitization that was presented to
them.10
And there surely were too many corrupt mortgage brokers
who nudged homeowners toward innapropriate or
overpriced loans.
But homeowners and investors were the ones who agreed to
these loans. They were not all simply victims. Many people
signed documents with misleading information or even bald
lies, and many were hoping to make easy profits from real
estate speculation.11
And Wall Street compensation practices made everything
worse, by encouraging the executives of the largest banks to

9. Securitization and the further repackaging of mortgage-backed securities in
Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) and synthetic CDOs are a focus of Michael Lewis’s
engaging book on the crisis. MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT: INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY
MACHINE (2010). The heroes of Lewis’s story are a handful of oddball investors who
recognized the looming disaster and placed large bets against the real estate market.
10. The credit rating agencies faced a conflict of interest because the mortgage-backed
securities were presented for rating by the banks that had created them, and the same bank
paid the cost of the rating. The inherent conflict in this system—known as issuer pays—was
exacerbated after Fitch Ratings entered the market, which increased ratings competition.
Because a bank that was unhappy with a proposed rating could take its business elsewhere,
the rating agencies had strong incentives to give high ratings. This problem is described and
modeled in Patrick Bolton et al., The Credit Ratings Game, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 14712, 2009), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/
w14712.pdf. The Dodd-Frank Act does not eliminate the issuer pays framework, but it
requires regulators to remove the references to SEC-approved rating agencies from a wide
range of laws. See Dodd-Frank Act § 939.
11. Bill Cohan has written that “one of the dirty little secrets of the financial crisis is
that one homeowner after another signed mortgage-loan documents that were filled with
inaccurate information about his or her net worth, assets, salaries and ability to make
monthly mortgage payments.” William D. Cohan, The Elizabeth Warren Fallacy, N.Y.
OPINIONATER,
(Sept,
30,
2010,
9:00
PM),
available
at
TIMES
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/ 2010/09/30/the-elizabeth-warren-fallacy/.
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push the banks towards high risk, high reward strategies—
like creating and holding mortgage-backed securities.12
And there might not have been a real estate bubble at all had
it not been for a glut of savings in Asia, which Asian
countries responded to by buying American treasury bonds,
thus providing ever more liquidity for the real estate
market.13

Conventional wisdom says that all of these factors contributed to the
crisis. To be sure, conventional wisdom has hardly been an infallible guide.
One of its most deeply ingrained “facts” attributes the market chaos in the
fall of 2008—the Panic of 2008—to Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy filing on
September 15, 2008. In my view, the claim that Lehman’s bankruptcy was
the catalyst of the crisis is almost completely mistaken.14 Still, the general
story about the reasons for the real estate bubble and its bursting is more or
less accurate.15
In short, we had a very complicated problem, with mortgage related
securities and the real estate market at its heart. How about the solution?
This takes us to the new Dodd-Frank Act, which President Obama signed
into law in July 2010.

12. My colleagues Bill Bratton and Michael Wachter point to the sharp spike in the
value of bank stocks during the 2000s as evidence of managers’ increasing emphasis on
shareholder value. William Bratton & Michael Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder
Empowerment, 158 U. PENN. L. REV. 653, 718 & Fig. 2 (2010). The emphasis on stock price
seems to have been encouraged, at least in part, by pervasive use of stock and stock options
to compensate managers.
13. For a discussion of the role of Asian investment in, among other things, U.S.
Treasury bonds, see Franklin Allen, Ana Babus, & Elena Carletti, Financial Crises: Theory
and Evidence, ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. (2009), available at http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/
~allenf/download/Vita/Papers.htm.
14. For critiques of the Lehman Myth, see, Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr.,
Bankruptcy or Bailouts?, 35 J. CORP. L. 469, 489-91 (2010); David Skeel, Give Bankruptcy a
Chance, WEEKLY STANDARD, June 29, 2009.
15. My summary of the conventional wisdom tracks in many respects the dissent of
three members of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission to the report filed by the
majority. Like the dissenters, I believe that the majority report overemphasizes the
culpability of bank executives and the failures of regulators, while the Peter Wallison dissent
lays too much at the doorstep of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and housing policy. See FIN.
CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, 112TH CONG., THE FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY REP. (Comm’n Print 2011),
available at http://fcic.law.stanford.edu/report (last visited Apr. 26, 2011).
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III. THE DODD-FRANK ACT
Contrary to rumors that the Dodd-Frank Act is an incoherent mess, the
Wall Street reform portion of its 2,319 pages (a mere 800 or so if the
margins are squeezed and the type face shrunk) has two very clear
objectives. The first is to limit the risk of the shadow banking system by
more carefully regulating the key instruments and institutions of
contemporary finance. By “instruments,” I mean derivatives16 and other
financial innovations; and by “institutions,” the giant, systemically
important financial firms like Citigroup or AIG.17 The second objective is
to limit the damage in the event one of these giant institutions fails. The
Dodd-Frank Act thus has two simple goals—limiting risk before the fact
and trying to minimize damage if a giant financial institution nevertheless
falters.18
The Dodd-Frank Act also has a recurring theme: partnership between the
government and the largest banks. This partnership, in which the
government locks arms with a small group of dominant institutions, looks a
lot like the European style of regulation that is known as corporatism.19
As a historical matter, the new government-big bank partnership is a
little surprising. Traditionally, American debates over how to regulate our
major financial institutions have pitted one group, who contend that the
biggest institutions should be broken up if they begin to dominate American
finance, against another, who believe that giant institutions are inevitable
and that the government should simply make sure it has the tools to control
them.
In the 1930s, Louis Brandeis was the leader of the small-is-beautiful
view, while Columbia University professors Rex Tugwell and Adolf Berle
advocated the big-is-okay strategy.20 Both were important Franklin D.

16. A derivative is simply a contract whose value is based on an interest rate, currency
price or nearly anything else, or on the occurrence of a specified event such as a default on a
company’s debt. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 475 (8th ed. 2004) (“A financial
instrument whose value depends on or is derived from the performance of a secondary
source such as an underlying bond, currency, or commodity.”).
17. This characterization and many of the details of this section are drawn from DAVID
SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND ITS
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES (2011).
18. Id. at 4.
19. European style corporatism is analyzed in detail in FRANKIN ALLEN & DOUGLAS
GALE, COMPARING FINANCIAL SYSTEMS (2000).
20. The debates within Roosevelt’s “Brains Trust” feature in many accounts of the New
Deal. One of the classic treatments is ARTHUR M. SCHLEISINGER, THE COMING OF THE NEW

2011]

MAKING SENSE OF THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL

187

Roosevelt advisors, and both helped to shape the New Deal corporate and
financial legislation.21 But the Brandeisian view largely won out with
reforms like the Glass-Steagall Act that separated commercial and
investment banking from the 1930s until 1999.22
What was odd about the discussions within the Obama administration
that laid the groundwork for the Dodd-Frank Act was that there really was
only one side presented, and it was the exact opposite side from the one that
emerged in the New Deal. The key administration officials—most
importantly, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner—all hailed from the bigis-okay side of the traditional divide. There was no strong voice within the
administration for the view that perhaps the giant banks should be broken
up, or at least scaled back.24
Dodd-Frank simply gave regulators more tools to do what they did the
first time around. Under Dodd-Frank, the largest financial institutions will
be designated as systemically important and subject to special oversight.25
By singling these institutions out for special treatment, the Act guarantees
their continued dominance of the financial services industry. This will make
it impossible for smaller financial institutions to compete, and it is likely to
stifle innovation in the financial services industry.
I have been talking about the way Dodd-Frank regulates the institutions
of contemporary finance, and have been very critical. I will be at least as
critical when we get to the new Dodd-Frank resolution rules for dealing
with financial distress. But before we turn to resolution and then
bankruptcy, I should note that I am much more encouraged by DoddFrank’s regulation of the instruments of contemporary finance—derivatives

DEAL 1933-35 (1958). For a description of the competing perspectives within the
administration, see, id. at 18-19.
21. Id. at 182-84.
22. See, e.g., id. at 443 (describing Glass-Steagall).
24. The principal advocate for a more aggressive, Brandesian stance was former Federal
Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker. Although he was an important advisor during Barack
Obama’s presidential campaign, he was excluded from the inner circle during the period
when the legislation was devised and promoted. Volcker’s implicit banishment is described
in detail in John Cassidy, The Volcker Rule, NEW YORKER, July 26, 2010. For discussion of
Secretary Geithner’s propensity for bailouts, see, e.g., Joe Becker & Gretchen Morgenson,
Geithner, as Member and Overseer, Forged Ties to Finance Club, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27,
2009.
25. The treatment of the largest financial institutions is set forth in Title I of the DoddFrank Act. As discussed below, the new Financial Stability Oversight Council is authorized
to designate nonbank financial institutions as systemically important, while bank holding
companies automatically qualify if they have at least $50 billion in assets.
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and other financial innovations. Prior to Dodd-Frank, derivatives were
almost entirely unregulated, in no small part due to legislation in 2000 that
prohibited the CFTC and SEC from regulating most over-the-counter
derivatives.26 This caused a lot of trouble during the crisis because
regulators had no idea how much exposure Bear Stearns, Lehman, and AIG
had, and were terrified as to what would happen if all these derivatives
contracts were terminated at the same time.27 Dodd-Frank will require that
most of them be subject to clearing house arrangements in which a clearing
house guarantees the performance of both sides of the contract; it will also
require that they be traded on exchanges.28 There are many uncertainties
about how this will work, and a number of potential pitfalls. If one or a
small number of clearing houses establishes a dominant share of the market,
the clearing houses themselves could be a major source of systemic risk, as
many commentators have already warned.29 But overall, the new
derivatives regulation is a vast improvement over what we had before.
It also may be worth noting that I favor the new Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (“Consumer Bureau” or “Bureau”). The new Consumer
Bureau got off to a shaky start. Afraid that Elizabeth Warren, who first
proposed the new regulator,30 could not be confirmed as director by the
Senate, President Obama circumvented the normal approval process by
naming her as an advisor to him and as a special assistant to Treasury
Secretary Geithner.31 While this has called the legitimacy of the Bureau’s
activities into question during the initial start-up period, the case for giving
consumers a designated champion is compelling. Most importantly, the
Federal Reserve, which previously had the principal responsibility for

26. See, e.g., GIOVANNI P. PREZIOSO, THE COMMODITY FUTURES MODERNIZATION ACT
3 (2002); Noah L. Wynkoop, Note: The Unregulables? The Perilous Confluence of
Hedge Funds and Credit Derivatives, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 3095, 3099 (2008).
27. See, e.g., COHAN, supra note 5, at 24 (describing regulators’ uncertainty as Bear
Stearns collapsed).
28. The clearing house and exchange requirements are set forth in Dodd-Frank Act §
723.
29. See, e.g., Craig Pirrong, The Clearinghouse Cure, 31 REGULATION 44 (2008-09).
30. Warren called for a new consumer regulator in Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any
Rate, 5 DEMOCRACY: A JOURNAL OF IDEAS, (Summer 2007), at 8, and again in Oren Bar-Gill
& Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PENN. L. REV. 1 (2008).
31. Katie Benner, The Elizabeth Warren End Run, CNNMONEY.COM (Sept. 16, 2010
12:03 PM), http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2010/09/16/the-elizabeth-warren-end-run/.
OF 2000
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protecting consumers, has a serious conflict of interest.32 One of the Federal
Reserve’s foremost tasks is assuring the stability of the banking system.33
Because practices that harm consumers can be beneficial for banks, the
Federal Reserve cannot be expected to vigorously promote consumers’
interests at all times.34 And during the real estate bubble, it did not.35
This brings us to the new Dodd-Frank resolution rules.36 The guiding
premise of the resolution rules is that the best strategy for dealing with the
failure of a large financial institution is to give the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) the same powers it has when an ordinary
bank falls into distress. When a commercial bank fails, the FDIC arranges a
sale of some or all of its assets and liabilities to another bank, closes the
bank on a Friday afternoon, and has everything ready to open again first
thing Monday morning.37 The advocates of Dodd-Frank argued that this
works really well with ordinary banks, so it is a great template for handling
systemically important financial institutions.38
The problem with this assumption is that none of the benefits of FDIC
resolution apply when it comes to the largest financial institutions. FDIC

32. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM:
PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS 75 (9th ed. 2005), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pf/
pdf/pf_6.pdf.
33. STAFF OF JOINT ECON. COMM., 105TH CONG., REP. ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THE
FEDERAL RESERVE (Comm. Print 1997), available at http://www.house.gov/jec/fed/fed/fedimpt.pdf (last visited Apr. 26, 2011).
34
See, e.g., Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 30, at 94 (describing Congressional criticism of
the Fed’s failure to promulgate rules protecting consumers). The Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency faced very similar conflicts of interest. Id. at 91 (describing OCC
intervention on behalf of banks challenging California credit card legislation enacted to
protect consumers), 93 (concluding that the “OCC’s inaction may also be attributable, at
least in part, to its direct financial stake in keeping its bank clients happy”).
35. Another problem stemmed from the multitude of different bank regulators. In
practice, lenders have a choice as to which regulator will be their primary overseer, and
many used this to bargain for lax oversight. The Office of Thrift Supervision, which
regulates savings and loans and will be abolished by the Dodd-Frank Act, was notorious in
this regard. See, e.g., KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS:
RECKLESS CREDIT, REGULATORY FAILURE, AND NEXT STEPS (2011).
36. The resolution rules come in Title II of the legislation, Dodd-Frank § 201.
37. For a helpful overview of the FDIC’s resolution strategies, and the relative
frequency of each, see Richard M. Hynes & Steven D. Walt, Why Banks Are Not Allowed in
Bankruptcy (2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
38. See, e.g., Written Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Commercial & Admin. Law of
the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009) (testimony of Michael S. Barr),
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Barr091022.pdf.
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resolution is an opaque process that offers no real opportunity to secondguess the FDIC’s decisions as to who gets what.39 It has none of the
transparency and rule of law virtues of bankruptcy. This may be justified
with the small and medium-sized banks that the FDIC ordinarily handles.
The vast majority of the liabilities of these banks are insured deposits.40 Not
only is it important that consumers have access to those deposits at all
times, but, because of the deposit guarantee, the government is by far the
largest creditor, so it is the government’s money that is at stake.
None of this holds true with a large bank holding company, much less
with an insurance company, like AIG, or investment bank, like Lehman
Brothers. In addition, the FDIC strategy of quick, secret sales is much less
effective with large institutions.41 With a big institution, there often will not
be any plausible buyers. If regulators do manage to find a buyer, on the
other hand, the sale is likely to make a dominant institution even more
dominant. Just look at the size of JP Morgan Chase—over two trillion
dollars in assets after its acquisitions of Bear Stearns and Washington
Mutual.42
The resolution rules give bank regulators the power to take over any
systemically important financial institutions that are in trouble (even if the
institutions have not been designated as systemically important).43
Lawmakers added a few bankruptcy provisions—such as the power to
retrieve preferences and fraudulent conveyances—to make it look a little
more like bankruptcy, but it really is not bankruptcy at all.44 The FDIC still
can pick and choose the creditors it wants to pay, which means that any
resolution is likely to end up looking a lot like a bailout.

39. This argument is made in more detail in SKEEL, supra note 17, at 123.
40. For specific details, see Hynes & Walt, supra note 36, at 32-33.
41. The FDIC’s resolution of IndyMac, the giant S&L that failed in 2008, is a good
illustration. The resolution is estimated to have resulted in an eight to nine billion dollar loss,
which is widely viewed as much more costly than a more efficient resolution would have
been. See, e.g., Binyamin Applebaum, FDIC Agrees to Sell IndyMac to Investor Group,
WASH. POST, Jan. 2, 2009.
42. See generally Roger C. Lowenstein & Jamie Dimon, America’s Least Hated
Banker, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Dec. 1, 2010 (profiling JP Morgan Chase head Jamie Dimon and
describing the bank’s expansion in the crisis).
43. The rules for initiating a resolution are set forth in Dodd-Frank Act § 203.
44. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank § 210(a)(11).
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IV. WHY NOT BANKRUPTCY?
In my own little involvement in the debates over the financial reforms, I
made no secret of my belief that bankruptcy is almost always the best
strategy for resolution of the financial distress of a large financial
institution.45 Bankruptcy is not perfect, of course, but I do think Chapter 11
is a surprisingly effective response to the failure of a large financial
institution. It could be even better with a few small changes to the
bankruptcy rules. (I also think bankruptcy may be a good solution to the
sovereign debt problems in Greece and Europe, and to California’s debt
crisis; but I will save that for other work.)46
So why did bankruptcy not figure more prominently in the thinking on
the new financial reforms? One reason is that the same people who
masterminded the 2008 bailouts were also the architects of the financial
reforms. Treasury Secretary Geithner in particular has long been a defender
of bailouts, as discussed earlier, and has never seriously considered
bankruptcy as an alternative.47
The second reason is the bankruptcy phobia that seemed to afflict
lawmakers and regulators during the recent financial crisis.48 Although
corporate reorganization has been used to restructure troubled firms for well
over a century—since the railroad failures of the late 1800s—and it has
proven remarkably adaptable to changing conditions, many people still
seem to imagine that bankruptcy is a synonym for death or, in the epithet
that was repeatedly invoked by advocates of bailouts, “disorderly failure.”49
There was reluctance in some quarters to consider bankruptcy-oriented
solutions during the crisis.50

45. See, e.g., Francis X. Diebold & David A. Skeel, Jr., Geithner is Overreaching on
Regulatory Power, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 2009; David Skeel, Give Bankruptcy a Chance,
WEEKLY STANDARD, June 29, 2009.
46. For an argument that Congress should enact bankruptcy rules for states, see David
Skeel, Give States a Way to Go Bankrupt, WEEKLY STANDARD, Nov. 29, 2010, at 22. Europe
appears to be edging toward the adoption of at least a few bankruptcy-like strategies for
dealing with debt crises. See, e.g., Charles Forelle, David Gauthier-Villars, Brian Blackstone
& David Enrich, As Ireland Flails, Europe Lurches Across the Rubicon, WALL ST. J., Dec.
28, 2010, at A1 (discussing the Deauville pact to impose losses on bondholders of European
Union countries that become insolvent in 2013 or later).
47. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
48. I have written about this phenomenon elsewhere. See David A. Skeel, Jr.,
Bankruptcy Phobia, 82 TEMPLE L. REV. 333 (2009).
49. The relevant history is discussed in DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION (2001).
50. See, e.g., Skeel, supra note 48.
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The final reason—the most depressing, but I suspect the most
important—was the arcane realities of congressional committee
jurisdiction. The financial reforms were handled by Senator Christopher
Dodd, who oversaw the Senate banking committee, and Congressman
Barney Frank, the then-chair of financial services in the House. If
lawmakers had included a significant bankruptcy component in the reforms,
Dodd and Frank would have been forced to cede a significant portion of
their control to the Judiciary Committee. The importance of this fact was
brought home for me by an email I got during the debates from a top staffer
for an important Senator. “We feel strongly that bankruptcy can and would
work for most financial institutions,” she wrote, “but have stumbled onto
the difficult challenge of the . . . jurisdiction issues between Judiciary and
Banking.”51 There was no way Dodd or Frank were going to let go of their
baby.
So it turned out that the deck was stacked against bankruptcy.52 What
emerged instead was a regulatory framework that relies on a partnership
between the government and the largest banks, and is likely to require
bailouts if any of the banks runs into trouble.
V. WHAT ABOUT THOSE CEOS?
The one piece of the puzzle I have not yet discussed is the role of the
CEOs of the big financial institutions. Nearly everyone agrees that they
were a key part of the problem.53 In the new afterward to the paperback
edition of Too Big to Fail, a popular book about the recent crisis, Andrew
Ross Sorkin concludes by quoting an op-ed by Elizabeth Warren:
This generation of Wall Street CEOs could be the ones to
forfeit America’s trust. When the history of the Great
Recession is written, they can be singled out as the bonus
babies who were so shortsighted that they put the economy at

51. Email from Senate Staffer to David Skeel and two others (Feb. 2, 2010). The email
says “Bankruptcy” rather than “Banking;” this is a typo.
52. I think a few small amendments to the Bankruptcy Code would significantly
increase the likelihood that it, rather than the new resolution rules, would generally be the
strategy of choice for resolving the financial distress of large financial institutions in the
coming decades. The most important of these changes would reverse the special treatment
that derivatives currently receive in bankruptcy. See, e.g., David Skeel & Thomas Jackson,
Transaction Consistency and the New Finance in Bankruptcy, COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming
2012).
53
. As briefly noted earlier. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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risk and contributed to the destruction of their own companies.
Or they can acknowledge how Americans’ trust has been lost
and take the first steps to earn it back.54
Although these sentiments are widely shared, the bank executives have
not been poster children for the crisis to nearly the extent that the CEOs of
the scandal-prone companies of 2001 and 2002 were. After Enron
collapsed, everyone knew exactly what Ken Lay looked like. But most
people cannot identify people like Jimmy Cayne of Bear Stearns or Richard
Fuld of Lehman Brothers.
Why are the bank CEOs so much more anonymous? The most obvious
reason, in my view, is that these CEOs do not seem to have committed
fraud, or at least blatant fraud of the kind committed by Enron and
WorldCom. The problems were more complicated—and frankly, harder to
understand—because they stemmed from a variety of legal and structural
factors, in addition to the outside pressures I discussed at the beginning of
this Essay.
Two structural factors stand out. The first is a dramatic shift in the
investment banking industry in the past thirty years. In the old days,
investment banks were partnerships, which meant that each partner was
potentially liable for all of the debts of the partnership.55 They were very
cautious as a result, and made their money by underwriting—that is,
selling—a company’s stock or bonds and providing various kinds of advice.
Over the past several decades, thanks to computers and the insights of new
financial theory, those old businesses became less lucrative and it became
much more profitable for the banks to trade for their own accounts—to buy
or sell derivatives, mortgage back securities, or nearly anything else. This is
the “proprietary trading” that has now been banned in commercial banks by
the “Volcker Rule” enacted as part of the Dodd-Frank Act.56 To raise the

54

. ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW WALL STREET AND
WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM—AND THEMSELVES 555 (2010)
(internal quotes omitted)
55. The transformation I discuss in this paragraph is ably documented in ALAN D.
MORRISON & WILLIAM J. WILHELM, JR., INVESTMENT BANKING: INSTITUTIONS, POLITICS, AND
LAW 267-80 (2007).
56. The Volcker Rule, which was championed by former Federal Reserve Chairman
Paul Volcker, was enacted in Dodd-Frank Act § 619. As enacted, the ban is narrower than
the version advocates originally proposed. Rather than prohibiting commercial banks from
holding stakes in hedge funds and equity funds, for instance, it limits the stakes to three
percent. 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(4)(B)(ii)(I). In addition, it remains to be seen whether
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huge amount of money they need to engage in this trading, nearly every
investment bank has converted into a corporation so that it could sell its
own stock to investors.57
The other factor was that the tax laws create an incentive to pay
executives in stock rather than in cash. Under a provision put in place in
1993, and which was designed to reduce executive compensation, a
corporation cannot deduct any cash salary to an executive that exceeds one
million dollars per year, but stock and stock options were exempt from this
limitation.58
Together, these factors created very large incentives for the CEOs of the
big banks to take risks and to generate big returns for their stockholders.59
And the limited liability the CEOs have as executives of a corporation,
rather than a partnership, removed the most important structural incentive
investment bankers once had to be cautious.
What has Dodd-Frank done to address this? The main thing the new
financial reforms do is try to make it harder for CEOs and their banks to
take risks by requiring more capital—that is, a bigger buffer on the bank’s
balance sheet; limiting the amount of leverage, or debt; and inviting
regulators to limit banks’ use of short term debt.60 These provisions may not
help much unless regulators really crack down, which they have not often
done well in the past.61
Some experts think we need to take much more ambitious steps to rein in
bank CEOs. Bill Cohan, the author of House of Cards, the book about Bear
Stearns, proposed in the New York Times that the top 100 executives in each
of the big banks should be required to commit their entire net worth to a
bond that would default if their bank failed. If their bank failed, they would

regulators will be able to prevent banks from disguising their proprietary trading as market
making or trades for clients, both of which are permitted.
57. One of the last to convert was Goldman Sachs. For a laudatory account of
Goldman’s conversion from a Goldman insider, see LISA ENDLICH, GOLDMAN SACHS: A
CULTURE OF SUCCESS (2000).
58. I.R.C. § 163 (2010).
59. To the extent the banks were too big and interconnected to fail, their creditors didn’t
have adequate incentives to rein them in.
60. See Dodd-Frank Act § 165 (heightening capital requirements for systemically
important firms) and § 165(g) (authorizing limits on short-term debt).
61. The one curb on compensation that tries to curb risk taking is a provision that gives
regulators the power to disallow any provision in executives’ contracts that they think is
problematic. Dodd-Frank Act § 956. But it’s far from clear exactly what this will mean in
practice.
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fail.62 I am not sure whether he was being altogether serious, but experts
from Alan Greenspan to a number of scholars have proposed that
executives or all shareholders of a bank be liable for some of its debts if the
bank fails.63 The goal is to go back to the old days when bankers were more
cautious. None of these ideas seem very realistic to me,64 but they do put
their finger on a real problem—a problem that I will return to in just a
minute.
VI. A CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVE ON THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL?
How should a Christian—those of us who look to Jesus Christ as our
Savior—think about these issues? I would like to think I have been trying to
answer that question already, and that everything I have said thus far has
reflected thinking from a Christian perspective. I am reminded of C.S.
Lewis’s statement many years ago, which I believe to be still true, that:
“What we want is not more little books about Christianity, but more little
books by Christians on other subjects—with their Christianity latent.”65 But
let me be more explicit about faith and finance and make five basic points.
The first is that we always need to be careful about how much we expect
from secular law. Law is essential in a fallen world, but it cannot save us
and can be used to oppress. It is important to be modest about our
aspirations for law.66 This is true with social issues like abortion and
gambling, and it is true with economic issues like credit and banking.
Second, with this caveat in mind, the most useful contribution that legal
reform can make is often to fix rules that have the unintended consequence
of encouraging people to misbehave. The implicit governmental subsidy
enjoyed by banks that are “too big to fail” has this kind of effect, since it
invites risk-taking, as does the tax treatment of executive compensation
62. William D. Cohan, Make Wall Street Risk It All, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2010.
63. For an especially interesting proposal along these lines, see Peter Conti-Brown,
Solving the Problem of Bailouts: A Theory of Elective Shareholder Liability, 64 STAN. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2012).
64
. Other scholars have proposed new forms of executive compensation that might
discourage excessive risk-taking. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, Executive Compensation and
Corporate Governance in Financial Firms: The Case for Convertible Equity-Based Pay
(2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1633906. Some of these proposals are more realistic than eliminating limited
liability, but it would, in my view, be a mistake to impose them by law.
65. C.S. LEWIS, Christian Apologetics, in GOD IN THE DOCK: ESSAYS ON THEOLOGY AND
ETHICS 89, 93 (1970).
66. This theme is developed in much more detail in David A. Skeel, Jr. & William J.
Stuntz, Christianity and the Modest Rule of Law, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 809 (2006).
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described earlier. The Dodd-Frank Act does take aim at the first of these
distortions, although the efficacy of its solutions is far from clear, as we
have seen.67
Third, I believe that the income inequality that we hear so much about—
the enormous gap between the income at the highest level and income at
lower levels—is a genuine issue with obvious Christian implications. The
real estate bubble disguised the gap between those in the executive suites
and ordinary Americans by encouraging Americans to buy and live beyond
their means.68 And we are now suffering the hangover from this. I do not
think the solution is trying to micromanage executives’ salaries.
(Unfortunately, the new financial reforms may invite some of this).69 It is
more likely to involve rethinking some of the policies that fueled the
bubble—including the special tax advantages we give to mortgages—and
renewing our emphasis on the obligations that come with material wealth.
A century ago, Walter Rauschenbusch, who was the leader of a
movement known as the social gospel, compared corporate managers to the
stewards in Jesus’s parables. “In the parables of the talents and pounds,”
Rauschenbusch wrote, Jesus “evidently meant to define all human ability
and opportunity as a trust.”70 “His description of the head servant who is
made confident by the continued absence of his master,” Rauschenbusch
continues, “is meant to show the temptation which besets all in authority to
forget the responsibility that goes with power.”71 I personally am not a big
67. As noted earlier, the Dodd-Frank Act instructs regulators to impose higher capital
requirements and limit a bank’s short-term debt. The former would force the bank (and its
executives and shareholders) to bear more of the costs of risk-taking, and the later would
limit the risk of a sudden failure. Both are only as effective as the regulators and regulation
that ultimately implement them.
68. For an insightful analysis of this point, see RAJAN, supra note 6.
69. As noted earlier, Dodd-Frank Act § 956(b) authorizes regulators to disallow
provisions in the compensation contracts of executives of systemically important institutions
that the regulators believe will increase risk taking.
70. WALTER RAUSCHENBUSCH, CHRISTIANITY AND THE SOCIAL CRISIS IN THE 21ST
CENTURY 308 (Paul Rauschenbusch ed., 2007). In the parable of the talents, which is
recounted in Matthew 25, a master gives ten, five and one talents to three of his servants.
While the recipients of ten and five talents each double the master’s money by investing it,
the third servant buries his single talent in the ground. The master chastises him for failing to
put his master’s money to profitable use. The parable of the “pounds” is a similar parable in
Luke 19. In the parable of the pounds—or minas—a nobleman gives ten minas to each of ten
slaves for trading.
71. RAUSCHENBUSCH, supra note 70, at 308. In the parable of the head servant, the head
servant abuses the master’s servants, and when the master finally sends his son, thinking the
son will be respected, kills the son. Matthew 21:33-46.
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fan of the social gospel, which tended to focus so heavily on transformative
social change that its proponents neglected Christ’s teachings about our
personal sinfulness and need for redemption. But I do think Rauschenbusch
is right that these parables can tell us something about the proper role of
executives. Here, as throughout the Bible, Scripture repeatedly warns about
the importance of economic morality.
Rauschenbush’s own conclusion was that many of the giant corporations
of his era should be taken over by the government and nationalized. “It is
probably only a question of time,” he wrote, “when the private management
of public necessities will be felt to be impossible and antiquated, and the
community will begin to experiment seriously with the transportation of
people and goods, and with the public supply of light and heat and cold.”72
This solution seems to me to trade one problem for another, responding to
the excessive power of the giant corporations of his era by giving excessive
power to the government to run business. I fear that, by singling out the
largest banks for special treatment, the Dodd-Frank Act could carry us a
little too far in this direction. This leads to my fourth point, which is closely
related to arguments I have made throughout this Essay. I think Congress
would have done far more to make the biggest banks and their executives
more accountable—and more responsible—if it had taken serious steps to
downsize them, and had looked to bankruptcy as the strategy of choice if
they fail.
My fifth point concerns the moral consequences of the crisis and the
legislative response. Regulators are widely—and in my view accurately—
seen as having bailed out Wall Street in 2008, while providing little genuine
relief for the millions of homeowners whose houses were or are worth less
than they owe under their mortgages as a result of the bursting of the real
estate bubble.73 While the treatment of the largest financial institutions
seems far removed from the moral decisions each of us face in our
individual lives, I believe there is an important connection between the two.
Let me give a simple illustration. A friend recently told me about friends of
his who are wrestling with the question whether to repay their mortgage.
Although they can afford to pay, it would be a struggle, and the house is
seriously underwater. A strategic default—that is, simply handing the keys
to the bank or whoever holds the mortgage and walking away—would be
much simpler, and would save a great deal of money. Why should they
struggle to make good on their obligations, the friends asked, when the
giant banks were not held responsible for theirs? This is only anecdotal
72. RAUSCHENBUSCH, supra note 70.
73. See Skeel, supra note 46.
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evidence, of course, but experimental evidence seems to confirm the
cultural cost of the recent bailouts, suggesting that the bailouts may have
made homeowners less hesitant to default on their own home loans.74
The Dodd-Frank Act may actually make this problem worse. True, the
legislation purports to hold the largest financial institutions responsible in
the future by preventing new bailouts and requiring that these institutions
be liquidated if they fall into distress. But almost no one believes that the
legislation will forestall future bailouts. The claim that it will is not
credible, and could reinforce Americans’ skepticism about the fairness of
financial regulation. When we calculate the costs of the crisis, and consider
whether the Dodd-Frank Act should be amended, we need to keep these
moral costs prominently in view.
VII. CONCLUSION
Let me conclude by briefly answering the same question we have been
considering—how might a Christian think about these issues—in one last
way.
In the wake of the crisis and reforms, I cannot help but think of the
famous statement made by Rahm Emanuel, the former Obama adviser who
is now mayor of Chicago. He said, “A crisis is a terrible thing to waste.”75
What he meant, I think, is that a crisis is a great opportunity to pass major
legislation that would never get through Congress during ordinary times. I
believe that crisis is a great opportunity for Christians too, particularly those
of us who are lawyers, law professors, and law students, but in a very
different way. One of the greatest periods in the history of the church came
during the plagues that afflicted Rome during the first several centuries
after Christ. Everyone who could flee to the countryside to try to escape the
pestilence did flee. But the Christians stayed behind, and ministered to
those in need.76 They were not like everyone else. In a very real way,
Christians were the body of Christ.77
Our circumstances are obviously not as dire as Rome during the plagues,
but this period too is an opportunity for Christians to be different. We can
74. A fascinating new study by my colleague Tess Wilkinson-Ryan finds that 24.8% of
the subjects in her experimental survey reported that they would default at a higher value—
that is, while their house was less under water—if their bank had been bailed out than if it
had not been. Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Breaching the Mortgage Contract: The Moral
Psychology of Strategic Default 22 (2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
75. Jack Rosenthal, A Terrible Thing to Waste, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 2, 2009.
76. PETER R. S. MILWARD, APOSTLES AND MARTYRS 115 (1997).
77. See 1 Corinthians 12:12-27.
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be available for those who are struggling to find a job or unsure how they
will ever pay off their student loans. If we are struggling ourselves, we can
use our struggles as a way to minister to others. As I think about these
issues and the recent crisis more generally, I am reminded of an old hymn
called, “They Will Know We Are Christians by Our Love.” In the past
several decades, those of us who call ourselves Christians have not always
distinguished ourselves in public life by our love. In my view, there could
not be a better time for us to bring the words of the old hymn back to life.
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